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The “semiquantum” key distribution protocol introduced by Zou et al. is examined. The protocol
while using two-way quantum communication requires only Bob to be fully quantum. We derive a
trade-off inequality between information gained by Eve and the disturbance observed by legitimate
users. It guarantees that Eve cannot obtain large information if the disturbance is sufficiently small.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several “semiquantum” key distribution protocols were proposed[1–3]. In contrast to the common quantum
key distribution protocols such as BB84, one of the parties in these protocols uses only classical operations. In their
pioneering work, Boyer, Kenigsberg and Mor introduced[1] a two-way semiquantum key distribution protocol using
four states. Zou, Qiu, Li, Wu, and Li derived[3] its simplification that requires only one state. These protocols are
interesting, because they give insights into the necessary conditions for achieving secure communication. In return for
the merit that the protocols need only one quantum party, they use two-way quantum communication channels. This
makes the security proof difficult. In fact, only the robustness of the protocols has been proved so far[1, 2, 4–6]. The
robustness of the protocols suggests that information gained by Eve inevitably disturbs the communication between
Alice and Bob. While this robustness is necessary for the security of the protocols, as the no-cloning theorem was in
the BB84 protocol, the next important step should be taken for showing a quantitative trade-off relationship between
the information gained by Eve and the disturbance observed by legitimate users[7, 8]. This type of relationship in the
BB84 protocol is called the information-disturbance theorem[9, 10].
In this paper, we derive such a trade-off relationship in the protocol introduced by Zou et al.[3]. In this protocol,
the existence of Eve is noticed by performing two error-checking procedures. The inequality we derive relates the
amount of information gained by Eve to these error probabilities.
II. FORMULATION AND RESULTS
A. Formulation
The protocol given by Zou et al.[3] runs as follows. Bob sends Alice N qubits each in the state |+〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
and keeps all qubits he receives back from her in a quantum memory. After confirming the receipt of all qubits by
Bob, Alice publicly announces which qubits she reflected (without disturbing them); Bob then checks that he received
|+〉 and not |−〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉) on those positions (CTRL). For the (SIFT) qubits measured by Alice in the standard
(classical) {|0〉, |1〉} basis, a sample is chosen to be checked for errors (TEST). The remaining SIFT bits serve for
obtaining a final key via error correction and privacy amplification.
Instead of this full protocol, we treat its toy version using a qubit without the public discussion. This protocol
including Eve’s attack is described as follows. We consider two situations: CTRL and SIFT. In both situations, Bob
first sends a qubit to Alice in the state |+〉 ∈ H := C2. Eve makes the qubit interact with her apparatus K by a
unitary operation V : H⊗K → H⊗K. The whole state evolves into
|Ψ〉 := V |+〉 ⊗ |Ω〉,
where |Ω〉 denotes the initial state of Eve’s apparatus.
In the case of CTRL, Alice reflects the qubit without disturbing it. Eve again makes the qubit sent from Alice
to Bob interact with her apparatus. It is described by a unitary operation U : H ⊗ K → H ⊗ K. The whole
state after the interaction is thus described as U |Ψ〉 = UV |+〉 ⊗ |Ω〉. Bob measures a projection-valued measure
(PVM) X = {X+, X−} := {|+〉〈+| ⊗ 1K, |−〉〈−| ⊗ 1K} to check whether the state is in |+〉. We define PCTRL by
PCTRL := 〈Ψ|U∗X−U |Ψ〉, which is an error probability in CTRL.
2In the case of SIFT, after receiving a qubit, Alice measures a PVM Z = {Z0, Z1} := {|0〉〈0| ⊗ 1K, |1〉〈1| ⊗ 1K}.
The probability for obtaining z ∈ {0, 1} is calculated as pASIFT (z) := 〈Ψ|Zz|Ψ〉. The state after the measurement is
changed according to the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate. If z is obtained, the whole state becomes
σz :=
Zz|Ψ〉〈Ψ|Zz
pASIFT (z)
.
Alice sends the qubit back to Bob. Also in this case, Eve makes the qubit interact with her apparatus by using U . The
whole system thus becomes UσzU
∗. After receiving the qubit, Bob checks the state by measuring Z. The (conditional)
probability for obtaining z′ ∈ {0, 1} when Alice’s outcome is z is represented as pB|ASIFT (z′|z) := tr(UσzU∗Zz′). Using
these quantities, we define an error probability in SIFT by PSIFT := p
B|A
SIFT (1|0)pASIFT (0)+pB|ASIFT (0|1)pASIFT (1). This
quantity is represented as PSIFT = 〈Ψ|Z0U∗Z1UZ0|Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|Z1U∗Z0UZ1|Ψ〉. Eve’s purpose is to know the outcome
obtained by Alice. Let us denote the state possessed by Eve after the two-way quantum communication when Alice
obtains z in SIFT by ρz. It is represented as
ρz := trH(UσzU∗),
where trH is the partial trace over H. Eve measures a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) E = {Ee} which
acts only on K for extracting information. That is, each Ee can be represented as Ee = 1H ⊗ Eˆe by using some
Eˆe. We denote by p
E|A
SIFT (e|z) the probability for obtaining an outcome e when Alice obtains z. It is represented as
p
E|A
SIFT (e|z) = tr(ρzEe). We denote by pAESIFT (z, e) the joint probability representing the case that Alice obtains z and
Eve obtains e. This quantity is calculated as pAESIFT (z, e) = p
E|A
SIFT (e|z)pASIFT (z) = 〈Ψ|ZzU∗EeUZz|Ψ〉. In addition,
the probability for obtaining e is calculated as pESIFT (e) :=
∑
z p
E|A
SIFT (e|z)pASIFT (z). The information gained by Eve
is characterized by the mutual information, which is defined by
I(A : E) = H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E),
where H(A) := −∑z pASIFT (z) log2 pASIFT (z), H(E) := −∑e pESIFT (e) log2 pESIFT (e) and H(A,E) :=
−∑z,e pAESIFT (z, e) log2 pAE(z, e). Eve has two chances to make her apparatus interact with the qubit. It is obvi-
ous that each interaction can help her obtain information. For instance, Eve can have an entangled state between
her apparatus and the qubit sent to Alice by using V . Although it brings her information, this interaction leaves its
trace behind by disturbing the state. Our aim in this paper is to derive a trade-off inequality that bounds I(A : E)
by PCTRL and PSIFT for general attacks in which both U and V are arbitrary.
B. Relation between information and disturbance
The following is our main theorem.
Theorem 1 The information gained by Eve can be bounded from above as
I(A : E) ≤ 2
√
PCTRL + 6P
1/4
SIFT ,
where PSIFT and PCTRL are the error probabilities defined above.
This theorem generalizes the robustness result. In fact, if we put PCTRL = PSIFT = 0 in the above inequality,
I(A : E) = 0 follows. That is, information gained by Eve inevitably causes disturbance. Moreover, the theorem
guarantees that information gained by Eve is small if both of the probabilities PCTRL and PSIFT are sufficiently
small.
We employ two lemmas to prove our main theorem. The following lemma is employed to bound the mutual
information by a quantity that is easier to treat.
Lemma 1 Let X and Y be random variables. Suppose that X takes a value in {0, 1}. Denote by pXY (x, y) the joint
probability representing the case that X takes x and Y takes y. The mutual information between X and Y is bounded
as
I(X : Y ) ≤
√√√√1− 4
(∑
y
pXY (0, y)1/2pXY (1, y)1/2
)2
.
3Proof: The proof is the slightest modification of Theorem 1 in Ref.[11]. Let us denote by pX(x) and pY (y)
the marginal probabilities with their apparent notations, and by pX|Y (x|y) the conditional probability defined by
pX|Y (x|y) = pXY (x,y)pY (y) . The mutual information can be written as
I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ),
where H(X) := −∑x pX(x) log2 pX(x) and H(X |Y ) := −∑y pY (y)∑x pX|Y (x|y) log2 pX|Y (x|y). Because H(X) ≤ 1
and −∑x pX|Y (x|y) log2 pX|Y (x|y) ≥ 2min{pX|Y (0|y), pX|Y (1|y)} hold, it holds that
I(X : Y ) ≤ 1− 2
∑
y
pY (y)min{pX|X(0|y), pX|Y (1|y)}.
Using pX|Y (0|y) + pX|Y (1|y) = 1, we obtain −2min{pX|Y (0|y), pX|Y (1|y)} = −1 +
∣∣pX|Y (0|y)− pX|Y (1|y)∣∣. Thus it
holds that
I(X : Y ) ≤
∑
y
pY (y)
∣∣∣pX|Y (0|y)− pX|Y (1|y)∣∣∣ =∑
y
∣∣pXY (0, y)− pXY (1, y)∣∣ .
The right-hand side of this inequality can be bounded as follows:∑
y
∣∣pXY (0, y)− pXY (1, y)∣∣
=
∑
y
∣∣∣∣
√
pXY (0, y)−
√
pXY (1, y)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
√
pXY (0, y) +
√
pXY (1, y)
∣∣∣∣
≤
(∑
y
(√
pXY (0, y)−
√
pXY (1, y)
)2∑
y
(√
pXY (0, y) +
√
pXY (1, y)
)2)1/2
=
(
1− 2
∑
y
pXY (0, y)1/2pXY (1, y)1/2
)1/2(
1 + 2
∑
y
pXY (0, y)1/2pXY (1, y)1/2
)1/2
=

1− 4
(∑
y
pXY (0, y)1/2pXY (1, y)1/2
)2
1/2
,
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
The following lemma plays an important role in relating probabilities in SIFT and CTRL with each other.
Lemma 2 For any (possibly unnormalized) vectors |φ0〉, |φ1〉 ∈ H ⊗ K, any bounded operator X acting only on H,
any POVM E = {Ee} acting only on K, it holds that
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| ≤ ‖X‖
∑
e
〈φ0|Ee|φ0〉1/2〈φ1|Ee|φ1〉1/2, (1)
where ‖ · ‖ is an operator norm defined by ‖X‖ := supφ 6=0 ‖X|φ〉‖‖|φ〉‖ .
Proof: Using the commutativity between E
1/2
e and X , we obtain
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| = |
∑
e
〈φ0|XEe|φ1〉| = |
∑
e
〈φ0|E1/2e XE1/2e |φ1〉|.
We further obtain
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| ≤
∑
e
|〈φ0|E1/2e XE1/2e |φ1〉|
≤
∑
e
〈φ0|Ee|φ0〉1/2〈φ1|E1/2e X∗XE1/2e |φ1〉1/2
≤
∑
e
〈φ0|Ee|φ0〉1/2〈φ1|Ee|φ1〉1/2‖X‖,
4where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to derive the second line and the definition of the operator norm to
derive the third line.
Proof: (Proof of Theorem 1) We apply Lemma 1 to pAESIFT (z, e) in order to bound I(A : E). To bound p
AE
SIFT (z, e) by
PSIFT and PCTRL, we compare this quantity with another probability p0(z, e) defined by p0(z, e) := 〈Ψ|U∗ZzEeU |Ψ〉.
Using Zz + Zz⊕1 = 1, we obtain
UZz = ZzUZz + Zz⊕1UZz
= ZzU + Cz,
where Cz := Zz⊕1UZz − ZzUZz⊕1. Thus it holds that
pAESIFT (z, e) = 〈Ψ|(U∗Zz + C∗z )Ee(ZzU + Cz)|Ψ〉
= p0(z, e) + 〈Ψ|U∗ZzEeCz |Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|C∗zZzEeU |Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz|Ψ〉.
We obtain ∣∣pAESIFT (z, e)− p0(z, e)∣∣ = |〈Ψ|U∗ZzEeCz|Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|C∗zZzEeU |Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz |Ψ〉|
≤ 〈Ψ|U∗ZzEeU |Ψ〉1/2〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz |Ψ〉1/2〈Ψ|U∗ZzEeU |Ψ〉1/2
+〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz |Ψ〉
= 2p0(z, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz |Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz|Ψ〉,
where we used the triangular inequality and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Because |a−b| ≤ c implies |√a−
√
b| ≤ √c
for positive a, b and c, it holds that∣∣∣∣
√
pAESIFT (z, e)−
√
p0(z, e)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (2p0(z, e)1/2〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz |Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗zEeCz|Ψ〉)1/2 . (2)
We apply Lemma 2 to |φ0〉 = Z0U |Ψ〉, |φ1〉 = Z1U |Ψ〉 and X = |0〉〈1| ⊗ 1K. The left-hand side of (1) can be bounded
as
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| = |〈Ψ|U∗(|0〉〈1| ⊗ 1K)U |Ψ〉|
≥ 〈Ψ|U
∗(|0〉〈1| ⊗ 1K)U |Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|U∗(|1〉〈0| ⊗ 1K)U |Ψ〉
2
=
1
2
− 〈Ψ|U∗X−U |Ψ〉
=
1
2
− PCTRL. (3)
The right-hand side of (1) becomes
‖X‖
∑
e
〈φ0|Ee|φ0〉1/2〈φ1|Ee|φ1〉1/2 =
∑
e
p0(0, e)
1/2p0(1.e)
1/2
≤
∑
e
(
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2 +
(
2p0(0, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉
)1/2)
·
(
pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2 +
(
2p0(1, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉
)1/2)
, (4)
5where we used (2). By using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can further bound the above inequality as
(4) ≤
∑
e
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2
+pASIFT (0)
1/2
(∑
e
(2p0(1, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉)
)1/2
+pASIFT (1)
1/2
(∑
e
(2p0(0, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉)
)1/2
+
(∑
e
(2p0(1, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉)
)1/2
×
(∑
e
(2p0(0, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉)
)1/2
.
The terms
∑
e(2p0(0, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉1/2+〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉) and
∑
e(2p0(1, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉1/2+〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉)
are bounded as ∑
e
(2p0(0, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗0EeC0|Ψ〉)
≤ 2pA0 (0)1/2〈Ψ|C∗0C0|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗0C0|Ψ〉∑
e
(2p0(1, e)
1/2〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗1EeC1|Ψ〉)
≤ 2pA0 (1)1/2〈Ψ|C∗1C1|Ψ〉1/2 + 〈Ψ|C∗1C1|Ψ〉,
where pA0 (z) :=
∑
e p0(z, e) and we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the relation
∑
eEe = 1K. Because
C∗zCz = ZzU
∗Zz⊕1UZz + Zz⊕1U∗ZzUZz⊕1 holds, we have, for z = 0, 1,
〈Ψ|C∗zCz |Ψ〉 = PSIFT .
Thus we obtain
‖X‖
∑
e
〈φ0|Ee|φ0〉1/2〈φ1|Ee|φ1〉1/2 ≤
∑
e
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2
+pASIFT (0)
1/2(2pA0 (1)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + PSIFT )
1/2
+pASIFT (1)
1/2(2pA0 (0)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + PSIFT )
1/2
+(2pA0 (1)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + PSIFT )
1/2(2pA0 (0)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + PSIFT )
1/2.
≤
∑
e
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2
+(2pA0 (1)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + 2p
A
0 (0)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + 2PSIFT )
1/2
+
1
2
(
2pA0 (1)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + 2p
A
0 (0)
1/2P
1/2
SIFT + 2PSIFT
)
,
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again. Because PSIFT ≤ P 1/2SIFT and pA0 (0), pA0 (1) ≤ 1 hold, it holds
that
‖X‖
∑
e
〈φ0|Ee|φ0〉1/2〈φ1|Ee|φ1〉1/2
≤
∑
e
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2 +
√
6P
1/4
SIFT + 3P
1/2
SIFT
≤
∑
e
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2 + 6P
1/4
SIFT , (5)
6where we used
√
6 + 3 < 6. (Although the above inequality can be slightly improved, we do not treat it here as it is
not important.) Thus (3), (5) and Lemma 2 derive
1
2
− PCTRL − 6P 1/4SIFT ≤
∑
e
pAESIFT (0, e)
1/2pAESIFT (1, e)
1/2.
Now we can apply Lemma 1 to obtain
I(A : E) ≤ 2
√
(PCTRL + 6P
1/4
SIFT )− (PCTRL + 6P 1/4SIFT )2
≤ 2
√
PCTRL + 6P
1/4
SIFT .
III. SUMMARY
In this paper, treating the quantum key distribution protocol with classical Alice, we obtained a trade-off relation-
ship between information gained by Eve and the disturbance observed by Alice and Bob. Our theorem provides a
generalization of the robustness result obtained thus far. Moreover it guarantees that information gained by Eve is
small if both of two error probabilities observed by the legitimate users are sufficiently small. Applying the inequality
to the full protocol in order to examine its security is an important future problem.
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